Abstract. We show that general one-way trapdoor permutations are sufficient to privately retrieve an entry from a database of size n with total communication complexity strictly less than n. More specifically, we present a protocol in which the user sends O(K 2 ) bits and the server sends n − cn K bits (for any constant c), where K is the security parameter of the trapdoor permutations. Thus, for sufficiently large databases (e.g., when K = n for some small ) our construction breaks the informationtheoretic lower-bound (of at least n bits). This demonstrates the feasibility of basing single-server private information retrieval on general complexity assumptions.
Introduction
Private information retrieval (PIR, for short) is a communication protocol between a user and a server. In this protocol the user wishes to retrieve an item from a database stored in the server without revealing to the server which item is being retrieved. For concreteness, the database is viewed as an n-bit string x and the entry to be retrieved is the i-th bit of x. This problem was introduced by Chor et al. [9] and various aspects of it were further studied in [1, 8, 32, 27, 11, 15, 16, 28, 39, 12, 2, 7, 24, 30] . A naive solution for hiding which particular item is being retrieved (i.e., the index i) is to retrieve the entire database x. The communication complexity of this solution is n bits. Solutions that are more efficient than the naive one, in a setting where there are identical copies of the database stored in several servers, were found by [9] and later in [1, 24] . In this setting, the user can make queries to different servers and use the answers to reconstruct the bit x i . Assuming that the servers do not communicate with each other, then privacy can be achieved with a cost which is much less than n (e.g., O(n 1/3 ) when two such servers are available). Moreover, [9] have shown that if there is only a
In this paper, we show that this is indeed feasible. That is, we show, under the sole assumption that one-way trapdoor permutations exist (without relying on special properties of any specific assumption), that single-server private information retrieval with strictly less than n communication is possible (or more precisely, of communication n− cn K +O(K 2 ), where K n is the security parameter and c is some constant 3 ). We note however that, while the communication complexity is below the information-theoretic lower bounds of [9] , it is nowhere close to what can be achieved based on specific assumptions. This quantitative question remains for future study.
As we already mentioned, single-server private information retrieval has a close connection to the notion of Oblivious Transfer (OT), introduced by Rabin [37] . A different variant of Oblivious Transfer, called 1-out-of-2 OT, was introduced in [13] and, more generally, 1-out-of-n OT was considered in [4] . 4 All these notions were shown to be equivalent [5] and complete for all two party computations [25] . As mentioned, communication-efficient implementation of 1-out-of-n OT can be viewed as a single-server PIR protocol with an additional guarantee that only one (out of n) secrets is learned by the user. This notion (in the setting of several non-communicating servers) was first considered in [16] and called Symmetric Private Information Retrieval (or SPIR). Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [27] noted that in a setting of single-server PIR their protocol can be made into 1-out-of-n OT protocol (i.e., SPIR) with communication complexity O(n ) for any > 0 (again, based on a specific algebraic assumption). Naor and Pinkas [30] have subsequently shown how to turn any PIR protocol into SPIR protocol with one invocation of PIR protocol and logarithmic number of invocations of 1-outof-2 (string) OT. Combining our results with the results of [30] and with known implementations of OT based on any one-way trapdoor permutation [20] , we get 1-out-of-n OT (i.e., SPIR) protocol based on any one-way trapdoor permutation whose communication complexity is strictly less than n.
Organization and Techniques: Section 2 includes some definitions that are used in this paper. In addition, it describes several tools from the literature that are used by our constructions. These include some facts about the GoldreichLevin hard-core predicates [19] , some properties of universal one-way hash functions, introduced by Naor and Yung [31] , and properties of interactive hashing protocol, introduced by Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung [33] 5 . In Section 3 we 3 Further improvements are possible; see Section 3.2. 4 Loosely speaking, 1-out-of-n OT is a protocol for 2 players: A sender who initially has n secrets x1, . . . , xn and a receiver who initially holds an index 1 ≤ i ≤ n. At the end of the protocol the receiver knows xi but has no information about the other secrets, while the sender has no information about the index i. Note that OT is different from PIR in that there is no communication complexity requirement (beyond being polynomially bounded) but, on the other hand, "secrecy" is required for both players. 5 Interactive hashing has found many applications in cryptography (cf. [33, 29, 14, 34, 35, 18, 10, 6] ) since, in some settings, it can replace collision-resistant hash-functions but it can be implemented from general cryptographic assumptions. The drawback describe our basic PIR protocols based on one-way trapdoor permutations. This protocol is further extended in Section 4 to deal with faulty behavior by the server.
Preliminaries

Notation
We use the following notations throughout the paper. The data string is denoted by x, its length is denoted by n. The index of the bit that the user wishes to retrieve from this string is denoted by i. We use K to denote a security parameter. For a finite set A, we denote by a ∈ R A the experiment of choosing an element of A according to the uniform distribution (and independently of all other random choices made).
Definitions
In this section we define the notions of one-way trapdoor permutations and of hard-core predicates. The reader is referred to [17] for an extended background related to these definitions. -There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time generating algorithm, I, that on input
where g is (an index of ) a function in G K and g −1 is a string called the "trapdoor for g". -Each function g ∈ G K is a permutation over {0, 1}
K and is computable in polynomial time (that is, there exists an algorithm that given g ∈ G, and x ∈ {0, 1} * computes the value of g(x) in time polynomial in |x|). -Each g is easy to invert given its trapdoor g −1 . That is, there exists an algorithm that given y ∈ {0, 1} K and the string g −1 computes the (unique) value x such that g(x) = y (i.e. x = g −1 (y)) in time polynomial in K. -It is hard to invert the functions in G without having the trapdoor. Formally, for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm B, every integer c, and sufficiently large K
where "g ∈ I G (1 K )" denotes choosing a function g according to the probability distribution induced by the generating algorithm I.
of this primitive is its high round-complexity (our protocol for a malicious server inherits this drawback; the question of how to reduce the round-complexity of this protocol is an interesting open problem).
Remark: There are definitions of one-way trapdoor permutations that give more power to the adversary. For example, the adversary may adaptively ask for many inverses of his choosing and only then try to invert the given permutation on a randomly chosen point. Another strengthening of the adversary, which is of interest in some cases, is requiring that it can recognize if g is "well-formed". The way in which we use the trapdoor permutations in our protocols, none of these issues come up and so we stick to the above simpler definition.
Next, we will need the notion of hard-core predicates. Specifically, we will use the Goldreich-Levin hard-core predicates [19] . For a string r ∈ {0, 1} K let us denote r(x) = r, x , where ·, · is the standard inner-product modulo 2. The Goldreich-Levin Theorem [19] states that if g is a one-way permutation then there is no algorithm that can compute r(x) given g(x) and r. Formally, for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm B, every integer c, and sufficiently large K
Remark: the above definitions concentrate on the case of one-way permutations; however, they can be easily generalized to deal with more general notions. In particular, the Goldreich-Levin Theorem [19] applies to any one-way function.
Some Useful Machinery
Let G be some arbitrary family of one-way trapdoor permutations over {0, 1} K . It is sometimes convenient to view strings in {0, 1}
K as elements of the field GF[2 K ]. With this view in mind, let
Given G and H, Naor and Yung [31] define the following family of functions
where the chop operator takes a string and chops its last bit. For a function f ∈ F we sometimes denote f = (g, h) to indicate the functions g ∈ G, h ∈ H based on which f is defined. Moreover, if I is the generating algorithm for G then we denote by I F a generating algorithm for F that generates (g, g −1 ) by applying I, generates h ∈ H according to the uniform distribution and let f = (g, h). The following are basic properties of F.
1. Each function f ∈ F is 2 → 1. In other words, for every x ∈ {0, 1} K there is a (unique) string, denoted x , such that f (x ) = f (x) and x = x.
2. Every function f = (g, h) in F is efficiently computable. Moreover, given the trapdoor g −1 it is easy to compute, for every y ∈ {0, 1} K−1 the two strings x, x such that f (x) = f (x ) = y. 6 3. Collisions are hard to find for F [31] (i.e., given x and f (x) it is hard to find the string x ). Formally, for every x, for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm B, every integer c, and sufficiently large K
Note that property 3 does not guarantee that specific bits of x are hard to find. Instead we will make use of hard-core bits.
We shall use in an essential way an interactive hashing protocol of Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung [33] . Interactive hashing found many applications in cryptography (cf. [33, 14, 29, 34, 35, 18, 10, 6] ). This is a protocol between two players Alice and Bob, where both Alice and Bob are probabilistic polynomial-time machines. Alice is given as an input 1 K , a function g ∈ G K and an input x ∈ {0, 1} K ; Bob is given 1 K . The interactive hashing protocol proceeds as follows:
K subject to the constraint that these K − 1 vectors are linearly independent (viewing them as elements of the linear space Z K 2 ). -The players interact in K − 1 rounds where in round i they do the following:
• Bob sends to Alice H t • Alice sends to Bob H t , g(x) (the inner product of H t and g(x)).
The communication in this protocol, consisting of the strings H 1 , . . . , H K−1 sent by Bob and the bits
, define K − 1 linear equations and since all the H t 's are linearly independent these equations admit two solutions, denoted {y, y } (we use the same notation as was used above for the pre-images of f ∈ F to stress the analogy between these two tools; this analogy will also be used in our protocols). We now state several facts regarding interactive hashing that make it useful for our purposes:
-If Alice follows the protocol then one of {y, y } is g(x) (recall that x is an input to Alice). -Bob sends total of O(K 2 ) bits to Alice. Alice sends total of K − 1 bits in response.
-It is hard for Alice to find inverses of both y, y , even if Alice does not follow the protocol. Formally, for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A , for every integer c and sufficiently large K, if g is chosen according to I G (1 K ) then after A executes the protocol with Bob, the probability that A outputs x 0 , x 1 such that both g(x 0 ) = y and g(x 1 ) = y is less than Interactive hashing, as described up-to this point, works with any one-way permutation. In [33] one more property was used, which is needed in the current paper as well. Specifically, we will apply interactive hashing with one-way trapdoor permutations; this modifications gives the following crucial property:
-Given the trapdoor for g (i.e., the string g −1 ) and the communication (i.e., the strings H 1 , . . . , H K−1 and the bits H 1 , g(x) , . . . , H K−1 , g(x) ) Bob can compute both x 0 and x 1 (i.e., the strings such that g(x 0 ) = y and g(x 1 ) = y ).
PIR Protocols
A Private Information Retrieval (PIR) is a protocol for two players: a server S who knows an n-bit string x (called the database), and a user U holding an index i ∈ [n] and interested in retrieving the value x i . When considering the privacy requirement of PIR protocols there are several possible types of "faulty" behaviors by the server: the server might be honest-but-curious or it might be malicious. Below we detail the definition for each of these types; we note however that the difference is especially important when dealing with multiround protocols (as those described in this work).
An honest-but-curious server is a one that behaves according to the predefined protocol and just tries to deduce information about i from the communication it sees. This is formulated as follows: Fix a data string x; for every i, i ∈ [n] (where i = i ) the distribution of communications generated by the protocol when the user is interested in bit i is indistinguishable from the distribution generated when the user is interested in index i . 7 We stress here that x is fixed and the server is not allowed to change it during the protocol's execution.
A malicious server is a one that does not necessarily follow the protocol. It should be immediately noticed that there are several "bad" behaviors by a malicious server which cannot be avoided; e.g., the server may refuse to participate in the protocol or it may change the content of the database (say, it can act as if x = 0 n ). The privacy requirement in this case makes sure however that, no matter what the server does, the identity of the index i is not revealed. Formally, for every i, i ∈ [n] (where i = i ) no probabilistic polynomial-time server S can distinguish executions of the protocol when the user's index is i from executions of the protocol when the user's index is i . We stress that here, the server is allowed to modify its messages in an arbitrary manner during the protocol execution in order to be able to distinguish.
A PIR Protocol with respect to a Honest-but-Curious Server
In this section we present the honest-but-curious PIR protocol which proves that it is possible to construct a PIR protocol from any family of one-way trap-door permutations, with communication complexity smaller than n. (Later we describe some simple improvements on this protocol.) Theorem 1. If one-way trapdoor permutations exist then there exists honestbut-curious single-server PIR protocol whose communication complexity is at most
(More precisely, the user sends O(K) bits and the server sends at most n − n 2K
bits.)
(Some slightly better bounds are mentioned in Section 3.2 below). Let G be a collection of one-way trapdoor permutations, as guaranteed by the theorem, and let F be a family of 2 → 1 functions constructed based on G, as described in Section 2.3. Assume, without loss of generality, that n is divisible by 2K and let = n/(2K). The protocol works as follows.
The user picks two functions
R ) using the generating algorithm I F (1 K ). It sends the functions f L , f R to the server (without the trapdoors). 2. Both the server and the user view x as if it is composed of 2 sub-strings
each of size K (we refer to these strings as "blocks"). The server now applies f L to each block z j,L and applies f R to each block z j,R . It sends all the outcomes
to the user. 3. The user, having the trapdoors for both f L and f R , can compute for each block z the two possible pre-images {z, z }. Assume that the bit x i is in some block z s,L , for some s. The user picks random r L , r R ∈ {0, 1} K such that the hard-core predicates corresponding to r L , r R satisfy
It sends r L , r R to the server. (If the index x i is in block z s,R then r L , r R are chosen subject to the constraint r R (z s,R ) = r R (z s,R ) and r L (z s,L ) = r L (z s,L ).) 4. For each j = 1, . . . , the server computes and sends the bit b j = r L (z j,L ) ⊕ r R (z j,R ). 5. By the choice of r L , r R the bit b s allows the user to compute the value of z s,L (or the value of z s,R depending on the way that r L , r R were chosen).
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This gives the user the bit x i (as well as all other bits in the corresponding block).
Correctness: The correctness follows from the description of the protocol and the basic properties of F. The idea is that for the pair of blocks in which the user is interested, z s,L , z s,R , the hard-core predicates are chosen in a way that they are sensitive on the block which the user wishes to retrieve, and are constant on the other block. This allows the user to distinguish the target z from z .
Communication complexity: The only messages sent by the user are those for specifying f L , f R , r L , r R ; all together O(K) bits. The server, on the other hand, sends for each pair of blocks 2(K − 1) bits in Step 2 and an additional bit in
Step 4. All together, · (2K − 1) = n − n 2K bits. Therefore, the communication complexity is as claimed by the theorem.
Proof of Security
The only information that the user sends which depends on the index it is interested in is the choice of r L , r R (Step 3). We need to show that these strings maintain the privacy of the user's index. For this we introduce some notation. We say that a block z s,L (resp. z s,R ) is of type "
Hence, the choice of r L , r R defines a sequence of pairs in {E, N } 2 with the only restriction being that the pair in which the index i resides must be either (N, E) or (E, N ) (depending on whether i is in the left block or the right block). We also use to denote a "don't-care". So if, for example, the user wishes to retrieve the first block it picks r L , r R subject to the constraint that the corresponding sequence is (N, E), ( , ), . . . , ( , ).
Using the above notation, we will now prove that the server cannot distinguish any pair of indices i, i the user may wish to retrieve. Obviously, if i, i are in the same block then the user behaves in an identical way in both cases and there is no way for the server to distinguish the two cases. The next case is where i, i are in the same pair of blocks; say, i is in z s,L and i in z s,R . For simplicity of notations assume s = 1 then in the first case r L , r R are chosen uniformly from those that induce the sequence (N, E), ( , ), . . . , ( , ) while in the second case r L , r R are chosen from those that induce the sequence (E, N ), ( , ), . . . , ( , ).
We omit the details for this case since it is a degenerate case of the more general scenario where, say, i is in z s,L and i in z s ,R . Again, for simplicity of notations assume s = 1, s = 2; then, we have to distinguish the following two sequences:
(Note that if, for example, the server can tell that for some s the corresponding pair is of type, say, (E, E) then it can conclude that none of the blocks z s,L , z s,R is of interest for the user.) We now show that if the server is able to distinguish the above two sequences it can also predict the hard-core predicate associated with the family G. The first step uses a hybrid argument to claim that if one can distinguish the two distribution of r L , r R as above (given x, f L and f R ) then it can also distinguish two adjacent distributions among the following list of distributions: (N, E), ( , ), ( , ) , . . . , ( , ) Π 2 : ( , E), ( , ), ( , ) , . . . , ( , )
(If each pair of adjacent distributions is indistinguishable then so are Π 1 and Π 5 , contradicting the assumption that the server can distinguish.) Suppose, for example, that one can distinguish Π 1 and Π 2 (other cases are similar or even simpler; they might require flipping the roles of f L and f R ). Then, it is also possible to distinguish Π 1 and
To make the distinguishing property more concrete assume, without loss of generality, that for some data string x,
We use this algorithm D to construct an algorithm B that on input g ∈ I G (1 K ), y ∈ R {0, 1} K and r ∈ R {0, 1} K predicts the hard-core predicate r(g −1 (y)), with probability 0.5 + . This contradicts the Goldreich-Levin Theorem [19] (See Section 2.2). Algorithm B works as follows:
1. Choose h L at random subject to the constraint
Also crucial is the fact that since D does not have y (only B does) the distribution of h L looks random to D).
2. Choose a function f R ∈ I F (1 K ) (including the corresponding trapdoor!) and compute the string z 1,R (by using the trapdoor). Pick a random r R subject to the constraint that r R (z 1,R ) = r R (z 1,R ). It can be verified that the distribution of inputs provided to D is exactly what is needed and hence the correctness of B follows.
Some Improvements
We tried to make the description of the protocol above as simple as possible.
There are however certain modifications that one can apply to it in order to slightly improve the efficiency. One such improvement is instead of using two functions f L , f R to use d such functions f 1 , . . . , f d (where d may depend on K and/or n). Then, the user can choose hard-core predicates r 1 , . . . , r d such that the one corresponding to the index i gets two different values (on the corresponding z, z ) while each of the other hard-core predicates get the same value (on z, z ). Then, when the server returns the exclusive-or of the d bits this allows the user to reconstruct the block of interest. A second (more significant) modification that one can make is, instead of using F as above, where each f ∈ F is obtained by chopping a single bit from h(g(x)), we can chop some s bits (specifically, s = O(log log n)). Now, in Step 2 of the protocol the server needs to send only K −s bits per block. In Step 3 the user can pick s strings r's that will allow him to retrieve only the block of interest. Finally, in Step 4 (if combined with the previous modification) for each d blocks it needs to send back s bits. This gives a complexity of n − (d−1)cn log log n dK bits from the server to the user (for any constant c) and O(Kd log log n) bits from the user to the server.
A PIR Protocol with respect to a Malicious Server
In this section we deal with the case where the server is malicious. It is instructive to consider first the protocol of Section 3 and examine the possibilities of a malicious server to violate the privacy of the protocol. Suppose that the server after receiving the functions f L , f R from the user (in Step 1) can find a pair of strings
(note that the properties of F guarantee that for every x and a randomly chosen f ∈ F it is hard to find x ; but it does not guarantee that after choosing f one cannot find a pair x, x with respect to this f ; this is exactly the weakness that we wish to use). Then, the server can replace say z 1,L by α 1 . Now, when getting r L , r R from the user (in
Step 3) it can tell whether the first block is of type "E" or "N" (since it knows both z 1,L and z 1,L which are just α 1 and α 2 ). So, for example, if the block is of type "E" then it follows that i is not in the first block. This violates the privacy of i.
To overcome the above difficulties, we replace the use of the family F by the use of interactive hashing. While the two tools have several similarities, interactive hashing is the right tool to make sure that the server cannot, for example, force both α 1 and α 2 to be mapped in the same way. However, there is another technical difficulty in generalizing the honest-but-curious case to the malicious case. Consider the proof of security in Section 3.1. A crucial point in that proof is that we can make z 1,L (which is fixed) and g −1 (y) be mapped to the same value. In the malicious case this cannot be done because the server need not fix the database and may choose it in some arbitrary way (possibly depending on the communication). Intuitively, this means that the fact that the distinguisher can tell blocks of type "E" (equal) from blocks of type "N" (not equal) does not necessarily help us in predicting the hard-core bit. This will require us to come up with some extra new machinery (see the definition ofĜ below). We prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2. If one-way trapdoor permutations exist then there exists malicious single-server PIR protocol whose communication complexity is at most
(More precisely, the user sends O(K 2 ) bits and the server sends at most n − n 6K
bits. Also, if the server is honest then with a negligible probability the protocol fails; i.e., the user does not get the bit x i but its privacy is still maintained. 10 )
Let G be a collection of one-way trapdoor permutations, as guaranteed by the theorem. As a first step we construct, based on G, a new family of one-way trapdoor permutationsĜ which is defined as follows. Each functionĝ ∈Ĝ K is defined using 4 functions g 00 , g 01 , g 10 , g 11 ∈ G K−2 . Let x be a string in {0, 1} K and write x = b 1 b 2 w, where b 1 , b 2 ∈ {0, 1} and w ∈ {0, 1} K−2 . We definê
Clearly each suchĝ is a permutation over {0, 1} K . The trapdoorĝ −1 corresponding toĝ consists of the corresponding 4 trapdoors; i.e., (g ). The generating algorithm forĜ, denoted IĜ(1 K ) simply works by applying I G (1 K−2 ) four times for generating g 00 , g 01 , g 10 , g 11 (with their trapdoors).
As before assume, without loss of generality, that n is divisible by 2K and let = n/(2K). The protocol works as follows.
1. The user picks two functionsĝ L andĝ R (including the corresponding trapdoorsĝ
R ) using the generating algorithm IĜ(1 K ). It sends the functionsĝ L ,ĝ R to the server (without the trapdoors). 2. As before the server and the user view the string x as if it is composed of 2 "blocks" z 1,L , z 1,R , z 2,L , z 2,R , . . . , z ,L , z ,R each of size K. Now the server and the user play 2 interactive hashing protocols as follows. First, the user chooses K −1 linearly independent vectors in {0,
. Now, for each t from 1 to K − 1 (in rounds) do: -The user sends to the server H L t .
-The server sends to the user the bits
The same is repeated for the "right" blocks. That is, the user chooses another set of K − 1 linearly independent vectors H 
3. The user, having the trapdoors for bothĝ L andĝ R , can compute for each block z the two possible pre-images {z, z }. We call a block bad if the first two bits of z, z are equal; otherwise it is called good. If more than 1/3 of the blocks are bad then the protocol halts (it is important to note that the functions inĜ do not change the first two bits; therefore both players, including the server who does not have the trapdoor, can tell which block is bad and which is not). We call a pair of blocks z j,L , z j,R good if both blocks are good; otherwise the pair is bad.
Dealing with bad pairs of blocks:
The user chooses two more vectors
. It sends these vectors to the server. In return, for each bad pair z j,L , z j,R , the server sends
) . In this case both z j,L , z j,R become known to the user.
Dealing with good pairs of blocks:
Assume that the bit x i is in some block z s,L , for some good pair z s,L , z S,R (if i is in a pair where at least one of the blocks is bad then in fact the user already knows the block from the previous step and can continue in an arbitrary manner). The user picks random r L , r R ∈ {0, 1} K such that
(If the index x i is in block z s,R then r L , r R are chosen subject to the con-
The user sends r L , r R to the server. (b) For every good pair z j,L , z j,R the server computes and sends the bit
By the choice of r L , r R the bit b s allows the user to compute the value of z s,L (or the value of z s,R depending on the way that r L , r R were chosen). This gives the user the bit x i (as well as all other bits in the corresponding block).
Remark: Improvements similar to those described in Section 3.2 are possible in this case as well; details are omitted for lack of space.
Correctness:
The correctness is similar to the correctness of the protocol in Section 3; one difference, which is not crucial for the correctness argument, is the use of the interactive hashing (i.e., H
instead of "standard hashing" (i.e., apply the functions h L , h R ∈ H and chop the last bit). The second difference, is the treatment of bad pairs; however, from the point of view of correctness this is an easy case since both blocks of each such pair become known to the user. The only significant difference is the fact that the protocol may halt without the user retrieving x i (Step 3). However, the properties of interactive hashing guarantee that if the server plays honestly, then the probability of each block being bad (i.e., both pre-images start with the same 2 bits) is 1/4; hence, By Chernoff bound, the probability in the case of honest server that at least 1/3 of the blocks are bad is exponentially small in the number of blocks (i.e., 2 = n/K). (Note that if the server is dishonest in a way that makes more than 1/3 of the blocks bad then the protocol is aborted.)
Communication complexity: The only messages sent by the user are those for specifying the vectors
bits. The server, on the other hand, sends for each pair of blocks 2(K − 1) bits in the interactive hashing protocol (Step 2). If the protocol halts in Step 3 (either because the server is dishonest or just because of "bad luck") then there is no more communication. Otherwise, for each bad pair the server sends two more bits (and at most 2/3 of the pairs are bad) and for each good pair it sends only one additional bit (and at least 1/3 of the pairs are good). All together, at most n − n 6K bits. Therefore, the communication complexity is as claimed by the theorem.
Proof of Security (sketch)
Here we provide the high level ideas for the proof of security in the malicious case. Suppose that the malicious server can distinguish two indices i and i . The first (simple-yet-important) observation is that if the index that the user wishes the retrieve happens to be (in a certain execution) in a bad pair of blocks then all the messages sent by the user during this execution are independent of the index. This allows us to concentrate on the good pairs only.
Using the same notation as in the honest-but-curious case (Section 3.1), and repeating a similar hybrid argument we conclude that (in a typical case) there is a distinguisher that can tell pairs r L , r R which are drawn from the distribution
and pairs which are drawn from the distribution
This again is turned into a predictor for the Goldreich-Levin hard-core predicate. Specifically, let D be the distinguisher between Π 1 and Π 2 . Our prediction algorithm B on input g ∈ I G (1 K−2 ), w ∈ R {0, 1} K−2 construct an input for D as follows: As before it choosesĝ R ∈ IĜ(1 K ), including its trapdoor (the corresponding r R is chosen at random, based on the transcript of the interactive hashing, subject to the constraint that r R (z 1,R ) = r R (z 1,R )). Next, B chooses 3 functions g , g , g ∈ I G (1 K−2 ) and uses them together with g (in a random order) to define a functionĝ ∈Ĝ (note thatĝ is distributed as if it was chosen directly from IĜ(1 K )). Suppose that g is g b1b2 with respect toĝ. Next B makes sure that in the interactive hashing protocol corresponding to block z 1,L one of the two pre-images will be b 1 b 2 g −1 (w) (the properties of interactive hashing guarantee that this is possible; this is done by standard "rewinding" techniques, see [33, 29] ). Now, there are two cases: either the first block is bad (in which case, as explained above, it cannot be of help for the distinguisher D) or the block is good. If the block is good then this means that one of the two pre-images is (w ), for some function g b 1 b 2 different than g (by the definition of the block being good). Since for each function other than g, the algorithm B knows the trapdoor then obtaining from D the information whether the block is of type "E" or type "N" suffices for computing r L (g −1 (w)) as required.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we show how based on one-way trapdoor permutations, one can get single-server PIR protocols with communication complexity smaller than n, hence overcoming impossibility results that show that no such protocols exist under certain weaker assumptions [9, 2, 12] . A major open problem is to lower the communication complexity so that it will be comparable to what can be achieved based on specific assumptions [27, 7] .
Another interesting observation is that combining our results with results of Naor and Pinkas [30] , one can obtain a single-server SPIR protocol [16, 27] (i.e., a 1-out-of-n OT with "small" communication complexity) based on any one-way trapdoor permutations whose communication complexity is strictly smaller than n. In contrast, all previous communication-efficient SPIR protocols required specific algebraic assumptions [27, 39, 7, 30] . Specifically, [30] show how to implement SPIR based on a single invocation of PIR and an additional log n invocations of 1-out-of-2 OT on K-bit strings (their construction uses pseudo-random functions, however those can be implemented from any one-way function [21] ). Since implementing 1-out-of-2 OT based on one-way trapdoor permutations can be done with communication complexity which is polynomial in K [20] , the total communication complexity of our SPIR protocol is still smaller than n (for sufficiently small K) and we need only the assumption of a one-way trapdoor permutation. This result can also be easily extended to 1-out-of-n string Oblivious Transfer with total communication less than the total size of all the secrets.
